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Abstract
The paper elucidates the relationship between housing tenure, regional mobility and
unemployment. It develops a model that can explain the paradoxical empirical regularity that
higher owner occupation rates are associated with higher levels of unemployment although
homeowners tend to be unemployed less often. The choice of housing tenure affects moving costs
and thereby regional mobility and unemployment. In addition, moving costs reduce on-the-job
search effort and search effectiveness. The paper analyzes the impact of symmetric and asymmetric
shocks on regional mobility and unemployment and discusses effects of government intervention in
the housing market.
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1. Introduction
Much of the puzzle of high European unemployment is still unresolved despite
substantial effort and remarkable theoretical progress. Blanchard and Katz (1997, p. 52)
conclude that ‘‘[...] while many suspects have been identified, none has been convicted’’.
Nickell (1997) shows empirically that key factors of prominent models—including labor
market rigidities, the treatment of the unemployed, taxes, union coverage, union and
employer coordination in wage bargaining—do not provide a satisfactory explanation for
cross-country differences in unemployment rates. Although Nickell (1997) mentions that
lack of mobility potentially affects labor market outcomes adversely—an idea that is at
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Regional Science and Urban Economics 35 (2005) 305–325least as old as the concept of the natural rate of unemployment
1—and despite a growing
body of evidence of a positive correlation between rates of homeownership and
unemployment (e.g., Oswald, 1996), he neglects regional mobility as an explanatory
factor in his empirical analysis of equilibrium unemployment.
2 When Nickell (1998) adds
the proportion of homeownership to the regression, its fit improves considerably. The R
2
rises from 0.76 to 0.82. The coefficient estimate implies that a 10% point rise in the owner-
occupation rate is associated with an additional 1.3% points of the unemployment rate.
This paper develops a model that explains the links between housing tenure, regional
mobility and unemployment.
3 Few theoretical models focus on the interaction between
regional mobility and unemployment. Oswald (1997) predicts that higher homeownership
rates lead to more unemployment and that unemployment is concentrated among home-
owners. The latter prediction is contradicted, however, by the empirical fact that renters
have lower employment rates.
4
This paper develops a model that is consistent with the stylized facts about unemploy-
ment, housing tenure and regional mobility. It shows why higher aggregate rates of
homeownership are associated with higher unemployment rates, although unemployment
might not be concentrated among homeowners. It explains why high-skilled workers are
more mobile than low-skilled workers given the choice of housing tenure. The model
illustrates that increased aggregate homeownership rates are associated with reduced
search intensity, diminished attractiveness of job offers, and with higher unemployment. If
mobility and search behavior are partly determined by conditions in the housing market,
the wage pressure variable in models of the Layard and Nickell type (see Layard et al.,
1991) or the search effectiveness parameter in matching models (e.g., Pissarides, 2000)
become a function of housing market conditions. Interventions in the housing market
consequently affect labor market outcomes. This has important policy implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses
links between housing and labor markets and reports some stylized facts that motivate the
model of housing, mobility and unemployment that is introduced in Section 3. Section 4
discusses how shocks affect mobility and unemployment. Section 5 refines the model.
Section 6 extends the model to analyze interactions between search and moving costs.
Section 7 focuses on policy implication. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
1 Friedman (1968) already explained: ‘‘The natural rate of unemployment is the level which would be ground
out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is imbedded in them the actual
structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic
variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities,
the cost of mobility, and so on.’’
2 Evidence for a positive correlation between rates of homeownership and unemployment is also provided by
Green and Hendershott (2001), Partridge and Rickman (1997) and Pehkohnen (1999). See also footnote 9 below.
3 The model is concerned with regional mobility. Bo ¨heim and Taylor (2002, p. 370.) find in an analysis of data
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) that ‘‘[A] desire to move motivated by employment reasons has
the single largest effect on the probability of moving between regions’’ and that it is the unemployed who are
most likely to move, particularly between regions. Gardner et al. (2001) also find that joblessness stimulates
mobility, both in data from the BHPS and the National Child Development Study.
4 In a sample, in which 75% are homeowners, Bo ¨heim and Taylor (2002) find that over 50% of the unemployed
live in rented accommodation while less than 20% of those in work are renters.
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The model is built to study the link between the choice of housing tenure, regional
mobility and employment status. It generates predictions that are consistent with a broad
pattern of empirical results and with the set of the following stylized facts.
5
(1) Job flows in the labor markets are immense.
6
(2) Most of the cross-country differences in unemployment rates can be ascribed to
variations in long-term unemployment, and most of the rise in European
unemployment can be attributed to an increase in the duration rather than to a higher
inflow rate into unemployment.
7
(3) The outward shift of the Beveridge curve suggests that it has become harder to match
workers and firms, possibly because workers are less prepared to move regions and
spend less effort on search across regions.
8
(4) Aggregate rates of homeownership are positively correlated with unemployment.
9
(5) Private renters move relatively more than owners.
10
(6) High-skilled workers experience fewer and shorter spells of unemployment.
(7) Skilled workers migrate more.
11
(8) High-skilled workers also search more and prefer employed search.
12
(9) Regional migration is higher during economy-wide booms and is lower during
recessions.
13
5 The idea that housing and labor markets are linked is not new. Research by Hughes and McCormick (1981,
1985a, 1987) focuses on the private and public renting sector and concludes that council housing restricts labor
mobility and hence raises unemployment. Bover et al. (1989) argue that regional house price/earnings
differentials are important elements in wage and unemployment, vacancy equations.
6 See Davis et al. (1996), Contini and Revelli (1997) and OECD (1996), chapter 5.
7 See Nickell (1997).
8 In most countries, the number of unemployed has risen relative to the number of vacancies, indicating that
vacancies are filled less efficiently.
9 Oswald (1996) finds that the gradient of unemployment to owner-occupation is roughly 0.2 in different data
sets including cross-sections of OECD countries, UK regions, U.S. states, regions of France, Sweden and Italy
and a panel data set of UK regions. This empirical regularity is buttressed by the fact that nations with the fastest
growth of homeownership rates experienced the strongest unemployment growth. A 10% point increase in the
rate of owner-occupation is associated with an increase in the unemployment rate of approximately 2% points.
Henley’s (1998) findings also suggest that homeownership reduces mobility. Pehkohnen (1999) confirms
Oswald’s results using Finnish data. Green and Hendershott (2001) find evidence for a positive correlation
between rates of homeownership and unemployment in U.S. data for the middle age (35–64) classes. However,
see also footnote 22.
10 Bo ¨heim and Taylor (2002) estimate that private renters are most likely to move between regions when
controlling inter alia for income, education, age and employment status.
11 Evans and McCormick (1994) find that nonmanual workers have much higher gross rates of interregional
mobility. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) report that the likelihood of migration rises with educational
attainment. See also Hughes and McCormick (1987) and McCormick (1997).
12 Hughes and McCormick (1985b) find that education increases the probability of job search, and Pissarides
and Wadsworth (1994) provide evidence that skilled workers search more and prefer employed search.
13 See Jackman and Savouri (1992), Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) and Vanderkamp (1968).
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depressed regions largely comprises high-skilled workers but there is no correlation
between regional employment growth and low-skilled worker net migration.
14
Variations in regional unemployment rates do not stimulate migration of low-
skilled workers unless there is geographic wage flexibility. High relative wages
stimulate in-migration.
15 Homeowners also do not appear to move from high
unemployment areas to regions with lower unemployment.
16 Therefore, high-skilled
renters respond most to asymmetric shocks and are the first to leave the depressed
region.
Takingintoaccountthatlabormarketsarecharacterizedbylargegrossjobflows [stylized
fact (1)], a model is developed next that explains stylized facts (2) to (10).
3. A simple model
This section introduces a simple model that is consistent with the empirical regularities:
that higher rates of homeownership are associated with higher rates of unemployment
[stylized fact (4)], that private renters move relatively more than owners [stylized fact (5)]
and that high-skilled workers migrate more and are less often unemployed than low-skilled
workers [stylized facts (6) and (7)]. While these implications are not too surprising, the
model generates the novel result that unemployment does not need to be concentrated
among homeowners to explain the positive correlation between aggregate homeownership
rates and aggregate unemployment rates. In fact, unemployment among the group of
homeowners might be lower than among renters. The model demonstrates under which
conditions regional mobility among homeowners is higher than among renters. This
implication of the model is of great consequence for empirical work as it calls attention to
the importance of controlling for the expected income of workers when estimating the
effect of the type of housing tenure on regional mobility. The model is based on the
following assumptions:
(1) There are two identical regions, East and West. Hence, the size of the regions and the
number of jobs in both regions are the same.
(2) Workers must live where they work (unemployed can live anywhere). To accept a
job offer outside the home region, a worker must move and incur the fixed moving
costs k
m.




r for renters. Moving is more expensive for owners, i.e., k
o>k
r.
14 Evans and McCormick (1994), Hughes and McCormick (1985a, 1994) and McCormick (1997) all find little
evidence that manual workers migrate to low-unemployment markets, whereas absolute net migration rates are
much higher for nonmanuals.
15 McCormick (1997) reports workers migrate to regional markets with high relative wages. See also Hughes
and McCormick (1994) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989).
16 See Henley (1998).
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low-skilled workers who earn W=L, where H>L.
(5) High-skilled workers only receive job offers for high-skilled jobs and low-skilled
workers only receive offers for low-skilled jobs.
(6) Jobs last for one period. At the beginning of a period, each worker receives one job
offer. The offer comes from a firm in West with probability q and from a firm in East
with probability (1 q). Workers who reject become unemployed for one period and
get another job offer at the beginning of the next period.
17
(7) In absence of asymmetric shocks, q is assumed to equal 0.5.
(8) The unemployed receive benefits B with B<L. Benefits are net of any costs of
unemployment, C, including mental costs.
18
(9) The discount factor is equal to d,0<d<1.
(10) Workers’ lives are infinite.
19
Because wages exceed benefits associated with unemployment for any worker type (by
assumptions 4 and 8), every worker always accepts a job offer in his home region.
Reluctance to migrate in order to accept a job offer outside the home region initiates
unemployment. Since workers migrate only if they satisfy the condition
W   B > km ð1Þ
(see Appendix A), regional mobility—and hence unemployment—depends on wages
relative to moving costs and unemployment benefits. A rise in net benefits, B,o ra n
increase in moving costs, k
m, makes workers less likely to migrate and therefore more likely
to become unemployed. Condition (1) implies that renters have ceteris paribus a higher
propensity to migrate than homeowners, as they incur lower moving costs (assumption 3).
20
An increase in the homeownership rate raises aggregate moving costs and consequently
leads to a fall in the job offer acceptance rate so that unemployment rises.
High-skilled workers are more likely to migrate than low-skilled workers for a given
choice of housing tenure. High-skilled renters are most likely and low-skilled owners are
least likely to migrate. Corroborating evidence is provided by Bo ¨heim and Taylor (2002)
who estimate the probability of interregional mobility conditional on inter alia income,
education, age and employment status. They find that income and education raise
interregional mobility and that private renters are most likely to move between regions
when income and education are held constant.
The model predicts that an increase in the proportion of low-skilled (high-skilled)
owners unambiguously has an adverse effect on employment if moving regions is not
17 A fixed length of an employment spell is assumed for simplicity despite the awareness that there is great
variation in the length of employment spells (Farber, 1999).
18 Gross benefits include any payment or subsidy an unemployed worker receives as well as the monetary value
of additional leisure time or self-employment he enjoys. Let M be the monetary value of gross benefits and C the
monetary value of any cost associated with unemployment, then B=M C.
19 An infinite horizon facilitates the algebra and exposition but the important implications of the model can be
derived with finite lives.
20 This is confirmed empirically by Bo ¨heim and Taylor (2002).
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Not conditioning on income, homeowners might be more mobile on average if
high-wage earners are more likely to be homeowners. This indicates that econometric
specifications in empirical studies of the determinants of regional mobility must be
carefully specified to fully control for moving costs and expected gains from moving.
22
4. The effects of shocks
Next, it is analyzed how shocks affect mobility and unemployment rates for the
different types of workers. Predictions are derived that are consistent with stylized facts (9)
and (10). Asymmetric shocks reduce employment opportunities in the depressed region
(say East) and increase job offers and employment opportunities in the booming region
(West). This is modelled as a rise in q. Temporary random asymmetric shocks, in which q
changes for one period only, and persistent asymmetric shocks, are considered. Adverse
symmetric shocks are modelled as a fall of the job offer arrival rate. In particular, it is
assumed that workers receive a job offer every second period rather than every period.
Analogously, a positive symmetric shock is modelled as an increase in the job offer arrival
rate.
4.1. Asymmetric shocks
Proposition 1. A temporary random asymmetric shock tends to increase the number of
workers moving to the booming region (West) and tends to lower the number of workers
moving to the depressed region (East).
Proof of Proposition 1. If the shock is temporary, i.e., lasts one period, the moving
constraint is still given by condition (1) because the income stream from the next future
period onwards is not affected by the region of residence. However, as the asymmetric
shock increases q, a bigger fraction of workers in East is offered a job in West, while fewer
workers in West are offered a job in East. Since those who do not satisfy condition (1)
21 In this simple model setting low-skilled renters either always or never move. Lowering moving costs has no
impact on mobility over some range but causes discrete jumps in mobility rates once the moving condition is met
by a particular group of workers. These results disappear if we, more realistically, either assume continuous wage
offer distributions for different types of workers or a continuum of mobility costs.
22 Coulson and Fisher (2002) find, for example, that homeowners typically earn significantly higher wages than
renters do and are more mobile. Green and Hendershott (2001) point out that selection issues are important. For
example, those who expect to have more stable employment (and thus can amortize the sunk costs associated with
owning over a longer period) are likely to have lower user costs of owning and are consequently more likely to
become homeowners. Although the partial equilibrium analysis takes the housing choice as given, the model
implies that a higher job offer arrival rate and a lower job destruction rate reduce the need for moving regions for
job reasons. Green and Hendershott (2002) deal with some of the issues of selectivity and aggregation. Flatau et
al. (2003) analyze Australian data and point out that empirical results conflicting with Oswald’s findings (Oswald,
1996) stem from (1) highly leveraged owners having a greater incentive to stay employed and search hard to
become reemployed quickly after job loss and from (2) public house tenants paying below market rents and thus
having reduced incentives to move for job reasons.
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remains concentrated among immobile workers. 5
Proposition 2. A persistent asymmetric shock makes workers in the depressed region more
likely to leave and workers in the booming region more likely to stay. Because the effect is
bigger the longer the shock is expected to persist, serially correlated shocks have a bigger
impact on mobility than random shocks. High-skilled renters are the first to leave a
depressed region while the low-skilled workers, especially low-skilled homeowners, might
not move at all.
Proof of Proposition 2. If differences in job offer arrival rates between regions persist
throughout the next future period, the moving constraint for a worker in East changes to
W   B > km   dð2q   1Þmax km;W   B ½  ; ð2Þ
while the moving constraint for a worker in West changes to
W   B > km þ dð2q   1Þmax km;W   B ½  : ð3Þ
Since 2q 1>0, the moving condition becomes more likely to be satisfied compared to
condition (1) for workers in East and less likely to be satisfied for workers in West. For a
proof of the effect of serially correlated shocks, see Appendix B. 5
The bigger d, i.e., the more workers value the future, and the bigger q, i.e., the more
intense the shock is, and the longer it persists (see Appendix B), the more attractive
moving becomes for workers in East and the more attractive staying becomes for workers
in West. High-skilled renters are predicted to be the first to leave a depressed region while
low-skilled owners are the last to leave. These predictions are consistent with the evidence
reported by McCormick (1997) and Henley (1998). A comparison of Eqs. (1) and (2) and
of Eqs. (1) and (3) shows that the asymmetric shock changes the moving condition most
for workers earning higher wages. High-skilled workers in the depressed region become
more likely to move regions in response to the shock than low-skilled workers do.
Interestingly, it is possible that high-skilled owners are induced by the shock to move
between regions while low-skilled renters remain immobile even if their moving
probability in absence of the shock had been the same. Suppose, for example, that
H B k
o=L B k
r<0 so that both groups of workers would not move in the absence
of the shock, then an asymmetric shock could make moving profitable for the high-skilled
owner but not for the low-skilled renter. This surprising result, which to this author’s
knowledge has not been derived in theoretical work, could be tested in future empirical
work. The differential mobility responses of high-skilled and low-skilled workers suggest
that regional differences in unemployment rates are much more persistent in the low-
skilled labor market. These theoretical predictions are corroborated by the empirical results
of Evans and McCormick (1994). They distinguish between manual and nonmanual
workers and find that manual workers have low levels of gross migration and that
variations in regional unemployment persist in the manual labor market. In contrast,
nonmanual labor markets are characterized by similar regional unemployment rates and by
net migration towards regions with low unemployment and relatively high rates of
regional mobility.
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the length of the shock. To appreciate this argument, assume that shocks either persist
three periods or one period and that both scenarios are equally likely so that the expected
length of a shock is two periods. Suppose that there is a group of workers for whom
migration is optimal only if the shock lasts at least for three periods. Given an expected
duration of two periods, it is ex ante never optimal for them to move, although in half of
the cases migrating is optimal ex post. When workers learn about the true type of the shock
(say after one period), the remaining duration of the shock is too short to make migration
profitable. The moving constraint (2) might remain binding for some workers while
unemployment in the depressed region is increasing.
23 This is consistent with Evans and
McCormick’s (1994) finding that relative demand shocks do not stimulate out-migration
from the depressed region unless local wages fall.
Although migration rates for some workers seem not to respond to higher unemploy-
ment rates, a higher unemployment level that creates downward wage pressure has an
(indirect) effect on regional mobility if wages are flexible such that wages in East fall to
W
E, while wages in West equal W
W, W
W>W
E. Moving away from the depressed region,
East becomes more attractive as relative wages in the booming region rise.
24 To illustrate,
consider the moving constraint of a worker in East who is offered a job in the booming
region. If the shock lasts for one future period, after which relative wages are equal to 1,
moving is preferred if
25
WW B>km  d qW W max WW km;B
  
þð1   qÞ WE max WE km;B
 
g: ð4Þ
In all three cases—(i) workers satisfying W
E B>k




W B and (iii) workers satisfying W
E B<k
m—the moving constraint (4) is eased
more the higher the wage in the booming region W
W and the larger the shock q is.
26
4.2. Symmetric shocks
An adverse symmetric shock that affects both regions in the same way does not alter the
moving condition (1), given that wages remain unchanged. Moreover, the length of the
recession does not affect the moving decision either (see Appendix C). The shock, however,
does raise the level of unemployment because everybody enters the unemployment pool
23 Note that the unemployment rate rises in the depressed region among immobile workers because fewer of
them receive a job offer in their home region.
24 This is consistent with the findings of Hughes and McCormick (1994), McCormick (1997) and Pissarides
and Wadsworth (1989).
25 A worker’s expected discounted future income when moving to West is given by





1   d
W þ max W   km;B ½  fg ;
the present value of staying is given by





1   d
W þ max W   km;B ½  fg :
26 For more details see Dohmen (2000).
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mobile workers [those who satisfy condition (1)] but exceeds one period for immobile
workers. Consequently, the unemployment rate is higher among immobile workers.
Proposition 3. An adverse symmetric shock results in a higher level of unemployment but
does not affect regional mobility.
Proof of Proposition 3. See argument above and Appendix C. 5
Proposition 3 documents an important result that should guide empirical research
because it highlights the importance of controlling for changes in relative labor market
demand conditions (e.g., relative vacancy inflow and vacancy filled rates) rather than for
absolute changes therein when estimating regional mobility rates. It should be noted,
however, that mobility is reduced during economy-wide downturns if wages fall during
recessions because the moving constraint (1) is then less likely to become satisfied. This
enlightens Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989, p.750.) conclusion ‘‘[...] that higher overall
unemployment reduces (1) the likelihood that unemployed workers will migrate and (2)
the effectiveness of the incentives to migrate provided by vacancy differentials.’’
Positive symmetric shocks cause jobs to last longer than the period between two job
offers. Here, it is assumed that employment lasts for t periods, taN and t>1. Workers must
fulfill their contract and receive a job offer either when their job ends or after each period of
unemployment.
27
Proposition 4. A positive symmetric shock raises mobility and reduces unemployment.
The effect is stronger the stronger the boom.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the shock is temporary, say lasts for one period such that only
jobs accepted in the first period last for two periods, the moving constraint alters to
W   B > km   0:5d W   max W   km;B ½  ðÞ : ð5Þ
The moving barrier is reduced by 0.5d(W max[W k
m; B]). For immobile workers (i.e.,
for whom W k
m<B), this reduction is larger the higher the wage and the lower
unemployment benefits are.
If employment lasts t periods, a permanent positive symmetric shock alters the moving
constraint for workers who satisfy W k
m>B to
W   B > km  
0:5 d   d
t ðÞ




t)]>0, moving becomes more attractive. This is because a longer
employment duration reduces the number of expected future moves. The coefficient
27 The alternative assumption that a job offer arrives in each period irrespective of the employment status
complicates analysis. An employed worker would optimally accept a job offer in his home region, quitting the
current job to be employed for another t 1 periods in his home region, but he would reject an offer from the
other region and rather fulfill his current contract waiting for the job offer he gets after his current contract will
have expired.
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t)/(1 d
t)] is increasing in t.
28 Thus, the stronger the boom, the more mobile
workers become. 5
The moving barrier is reduced more during a temporary boom than during a
permanent boom for all workers (compare (5) and (6) and note that d>[d/(1+d)]).
Opportunity costs of not moving are higher during a temporary boom. Workers who do
not satisfy condition (1) but condition (6) become mobile and will therefore not become
unemployed. Workers who do not satisfy condition (6) become unemployed when their
job ends. Yet, they are still better off after the shock because they are employed more
often in their home region as jobs lasts twice as long. That regional mobility is
positively correlated with the business cycle squares nicely with the evidence reported in
the literature (e.g., Jackman and Savouri, 1992; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989;
Vanderkamp, 1968).
5. Refinements of the simple model
So far, it has been assumed that only wages differ for high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. There is ample evidence, however, that high-skilled workers receive more wage
offers. Moreover, employment spells for workers with firm specific skills and workers in
high-wage industries last longer than low-skilled jobs. Heterogeneity with respect to job
offer arrival rates and employment duration is considered next.
Proposition 5. The higher the job offer arrival rate, the lower are moving barriers and the
lower is the risk of becoming unemployed.
Proof of Proposition 5. See the proofs of previous Propositions. 5
Because high-skilled workers are more likely to receive job offers at a higher rate,
high-skilled workers are more mobile, less frequently unemployed and more often
observed to move in the data. Proposition 5 also highlights the importance of
controlling for occupation-specific job offer arrival rates in econometric models of
regional mobility.
Proposition 6. The longer the expected length of an employment spell is, the more mobile
a worker is and the less likely he is to become unemployed.
Proof of Proposition 6. See the Proof of Proposition 4. 5
Workers with longer expected employment relationships are more prepared to move in
order to accept a job offer outside their home region. Therefore, they are less likely to
become unemployed than low-skilled workers.
It is more realistic to assume that wage offer distributions are not degenerate as has
been assumed so far (see assumption 4). Suppose that H and L are the respective
mean wages of the wage offer distribution functions f(w) for high-skilled workers and
28 The first derivative with respect to t is given by ( d
t/(1 d
t)ln d which is positive because 0<d<1.
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Defining the wage required to make moving optimal as w




r, the probabilities that workers who receive a job offer from a firm
in the other region accept the offer and move are given by 1 F(w
r) for high-skilled
renters, 1 F(w
o) for high-skilled owners, 1 G(w
r) for low-skilled renters and
1 G(w
o) for low-skilled owners. Renters are more likely to migrate than owners
because w
o>w
r so that 1 F(w
r)>1 F(w







o). High-skilled renters are more mobile than low-skilled
renters if F(w
r)<G(w




29 The latter two conditions are always satisfied if f(w) and
g(w) only differ in the mean such that F(w)<G(w) for any w in the support.
Proposition 7. Everything else equal, a rise in the mean of the wage distribution increases
the probability of receiving a wage offer that makes moving optimal.
Proof of Proposition 7. See the argument above. 5
Proposition 8. An increase in the variance of the wage offer distribution raises mobility if
the wage required to make moving optimal exceeds the expected offer wage.
Proof of Proposition 8. If f(w)a n df ˜(w) (with respective cumulative distribution functions
F and F ˜) differ only with respect to the variance which is bigger for f ˜(w), then F ˜(w)<F(w)
for values exceeding the mean w ¯. Since w
m>w ¯ by assumption, such that F ˜(w
m)<F(w
m),
acceptable job offers from outside the home region arrive more often. 5
Proposition 8 therefore implies that mobility rates tend to be lower, ceteris paribus,i n
countries with more compressed wage distributions.
It is likely that the variance of an individual’s wage offer distribution is positively
related to his skills.
30 A straightforward way to integrate this idea into the model is to
assume that workers can either have a ‘‘good’’ job paying (1+h)H or a ‘‘bad’’ job paying
(1 h)H, h>0. Similarly, low-skilled workers can either earn (1+l)L or (1 l)L, l>0. The
moving constraint for a high-skilled worker being offered a ‘‘good’’ job is then given by
H B+hH>k
m; for those being offered a ‘‘bad’’ job, it is H B hH>k
m; and similarly,




31 High-skilled workers who are offered a ‘‘good’’ job are most
likely to move for a given choice of housing tenure as long as l<[(1+h)H L]/L.
It is possible that they are the only type of workers who move in absence of any
shocks if in addition (1+h)H>k
m+B>(1 h)H.
29 The condition that makes high-skilled owners more mobile than low-skilled renters is given by
1   Fw o ðÞ > 1   Gw r ðÞ Fw o ðÞ < Gw r ðÞ :
30 The skewed aggregate wage distribution observed in reality provides support for the hypothesis that the
variance of the offer distribution is positively related to income (and hence skills).




2 are the variance of the job offer distribution for
high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively. If l=h; that is, if remuneration of ‘‘good’’ jobs is 2h% higher
than that of ‘‘bad’’ jobs for both types of workers, the wage offer distribution for workers with a higher mean
income also has a larger variance.
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So far, it has been assumed implicitly that search is costless because workers
automatically receive a job offer at given intervals. Relaxing this assumption, the
model generates novel results concerning the interaction between fixed moving costs
and job search. For this purpose, the simple model of Section 3 is altered in two ways.
Firstly, a worker becomes unemployed for one period after his employment contract
expires. In each of the following periods, he receives a job offer free of charge.
Secondly, a worker can search for a job while employed in order to generate one job
offer at a fixed cost, s, i.e., on-the-job search is more expensive than search from
unemployment.
32
Beyond the obvious effect that higher search costs have a negative impact on search
effort and hence employment, the current model predicts—consistent with empirical
findings in the literature (e.g., Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994)—that high-skilled work-
ers search more and prefer on-the-job search. Higher opportunity costs make it more
profitable for high-skilled workers to engage in costly on-the-job search activity so that
they are less likely to become unemployed.
33 The model also implies that immobile
workers would concentrate their search activity locally if this was possible. This is likely
to lead to inefficient matching. The result that moving costs have a negative impact on
employment continues to hold.
34 A new result is, however, the model’s prediction that the
type of housing tenure influences search behavior.
Proposition 9. High-skilled workers are more likely to search on-the-job than low-skilled
workers and are less likely to experience unemployment. Renters are ceteris paribus more
likely to search on-the-job. The more expensive moving becomes, the less likely are mobile
workers to search.
Proof of Proposition 9. See Appendix D. 5
A worker, who would move even if on-the-job search was not possible, always prefers
on-the-job search if
W   B > þ
1þd
d
s þ 0:5km; ð7Þ
(see Appendix D) which is more likely to be satisfied, the higher W. A fall in d, a rise in
search costs s and higher moving costs k
m all increase the right-hand side of Eq. (7) and
32 The assumption that search from unemployment is free of charge is a result of scaling costs such that on-the-
job search is more costly so that s can be interpreted as the excess cost of employed over unemployed search. This
assumption is reasonable because unemployed often receive additional support from employment agencies;
furthermore, employed workers have to take time off to search and, unlike unemployed, incur a loss of income.
33 In fact, opportunity costs impact on the decision to search on-the-job. Workers whose wage largely reflects
firm-specific skills face higher opportunity costs than workers with more general skills and are therefore less
likely to search and migrate.
34 It should be noted that the assumptions about the length of the periods of employment and unemployment are
not crucial to derive these implications. In principle, the longer expected employment becomes relative to the
period between two job offers, the more likely a worker becomes to search and migrate. The length of the periods
chosen facilitates the illustration of the main implications of the model.
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optimally rejects a job outside his home region, searches on-the-job if




(see Appendix D). Again, an increase in search costs and a higher discount rate, i.e., lower
d, make searching less attractive.
Search costs are more important for immobile workers—the coefficient on search costs
in Eq. (8) is bigger than the one in Eq. (7)—since workers who are not prepared to migrate
only accept half of the job offers they generate and their search effort is obsolete half of the
time. However, the excess amount of income over benefits, W B, that is required to make
search attractive is lower for immobile workers if k
m>2s/d which is always satisfied if
[(1+d)/d]s+0.5k
m>W B>[(d+2)/d]s.
35 Thus, higher moving costs, lower search costs
and a lower discount rate d make mobile workers less likely to search relative to immobile
workers. The less a worker values the future, the lower is search intensity and the higher is
unemployment. However, the unemployment rate of nonsearching mobile workers is
lower than the unemployment rate of searching immobile workers because the expected
duration of unemployment is longer for immobile workers.
36
An increase in moving costs affects search effort via two channels that lead to reduced
employment.Firstly,itreducesthenetgainofsearchformobileworkerstendingtodiminish
their search activity. Secondly, it increases the proportion of immobile workers. Although
this tends to increase overall search activity, fewer matches will be formed in the aggregate
because immobile workers who accept only half of the offers search less effectively.
Although the inflow rate into unemployment might fall—some nonsearching mobile
workers might become searching immobile workers in response to higher moving costs—
outflow rates fall even more. The unemployment rate rises because unemployment duration
increases. These theoreticalresultsare consistent with thecombination of two stylized facts:
(1) homeownership rates have risen in OECD countries between 1960 and 1990 (Oswald,
1996), while at the same time, (2) the Beveridge curve has shifted outwards meaning that
vacancies are filled less efficiently; that is, it has become harder to match workers and firms.
Workers can belong to one of the following four groups:
(i) If they satisfy condition (7) and the moving condition (D.1), which is given in
Appendix D, they will search, accept any offer and will never become unemployed.
(ii) Workers might satisfy the search condition but do not find it optimal to migrate.
Proportion q of them will become unemployed, where q is the probability of
receiving a job offer in the other region.
(iii) Workers who are mobile but do not search experience a spell of unemployment that
lasts exactly one period. Thereafter, they accept a job offer in any region.
(iv) Workers who neither move nor search will become unemployed and the expected
duration of unemployment is two periods.
35 This is because it implies that k
m>[(2+d)/(d 0.5d
2)]s. Hence, k
m>(2s/d) because [(2+d)/(d 0.5d
2)]>
(2/d).
36 For nonsearching mobile workers, the expected duration of unemployment is one period, while the expected
duration for searching immobile workers are two periods.
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Random temporary shocks do not impact on search behavior when workers decide to
search before a shock is revealed.
37 Things are different if workers expect a shock to
persist in the future. If q, the probability of getting a job offer in West exceeds 0.5
throughout the next future period, workers take the higher employment prospects in West
into account. Searching becomes less attractive for workers in the depressed region and
more attractive in the booming region. For mobile workers in the depressed (booming)
region, the expected benefit from searching falls (rises) by d(q 0.5)k
m, whereas the
expected gain from searching falls (rises) by d(q 0.5)(W B) for immobile workers.
Workers in the depressed region become not only more likely to migrate if the shock
persists for longer, as shown in Section 4, but their value of search increases because
searching raises the chances of finding employment in the booming region early, which is
more attractive because it makes future moves less frequent.
7. Policy implications
The model implies that policies that raise moving costs reduce mobility and thereby
increase unemployment. The analysis of asymmetric shocks indicates that higher moving
costs slow the adjustment process as unemployment among immobile workers in the
slump region remains high for a prolonged period. Additional interactions between
moving costs and job search behavior reinforce the adverse effects of such policies.
These interactions are largely neglected in the theoretical and empirical literature but
explain the correlation between homeownership rates and the level of unemployment.
Subsidizing moving costs, for example, by making them tax deductible or by offering
some other form of tax benefit, increases mobility and thereby reduces the level of
unemployment. However, when a policy favors a particular type of housing tenure,
substitution effects have to be considered. For example, a subsidy for buying or building a
home reduces moving costs for those who decide to move into owned property. However,
it also makes owning more attractive so that more workers are lured into homeownership.
This has negative effects on future job mobility. Such a policy is especially bad if the
subsidy is only paid once upon becoming a homeowner because it raises aggregate moving
costs in future periods after the homeownership rate has—induced by the policy—risen.
Subsidies to the renting sector have to be evaluated carefully as well. At first sight, rent
control would probably be judged to be beneficial for renters as it is designed to keep rents
low. However, rent control reduces landlords’ return on their investment in renting
property, triggering a reduction of supply, either because property is sold off or simply
37 A negative (positive) symmetric shock increases (reduces) unemployment among immobile workers. An
asymmetric shock increases (decreases) unemployment in the region that is negatively (positively) affected
because it reduces (increases) job offers for immobile workers. Although the shock has no impact on the
employment status of mobile workers, mobile workers in the depressed region are worse off as they become more
likely to incur the moving costs. Mobile workers in the booming region gain because the risk of having to incur
the moving costs falls.
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38 This
makes owning more attractive so that some workers leave the renting sector.
39 Aggregate
moving costs rise so that unemployment increases. Whether unemployment rises more
among owners is ambiguous because the most mobile renters leave the private renting
sector first as the costs of additional immobility are smallest for them.
40 An increase in the
proportion of homeowners therefore decreases average mobility in the renting sector. It
would therefore not be surprising to see a higher unemployment rate among renters after
the homeownership rate has risen in response to the subsidy.
8. Conclusion
The model explains the empirical regularity that higher owner occupation rates are
associated with higher aggregate unemployment rates. For an individual, regional
mobility, and hence unemployment, depends on the difference between moving costs
and foregone income during unemployment. Any rise in the value of unemployment
relative to the value of employment, e.g., an increase in unemployment benefits or a
reduction in wages, reduces mobility and causes unemployment to rise. Because foregone
earnings during unemployment are larger for high-skilled workers, they are more willing
to move regions to accept a job than low-skilled workers given the same choice of housing
tenure. Conditional on the earnings potential, regional mobility is lower for homeowners
than for renters. However, high-wage homeowners are more mobile than low-wage renters
if the differential income loss associated with a spell of unemployment exceeds the
difference in moving costs associated with owning versus renting a home. Failing to fully
control for expected income (losses) it is consequently possible to find empirically that
homeowners are more mobile than renters. On the one hand, this result indicates that
econometric models in empirical studies of the determinants of regional mobility must be
carefully specified. On the other hand, this theoretical finding helps us in reconciling the
seemingly paradoxical findings that a higher rate homeownership rate is associated with a
higher equilibrium level of unemployment although homeowners have lower unemploy-
ment rates on average.
Higher moving costs and lower mobility raise unemployment. If the private renting
sector shrinks, e.g., because of government intervention or a change in preferences, more
mobile workers are likely to leave the renting sector first, causing average mobility in the
38 A shrinking private renting sector limits choices of those who are remaining in the renting sector even further
if landlords reduce supply at a higher rate than the exit rate from the renting sector.
39 Note that they are worse off than without controlled rents because they preferred renting when their
consumption opportunity were not limited. The loss in utility is reflected in lower mobility.
40 Moreover, those with higher incomes are more mobile and more likely to be able to afford ownership. In
Britain, workers at lower incomes have opted to leave the private renting sector for council housing. Mobility of
council tenants is lower than mobility of private renters (see Hughes and McCormick, 1981). Council tenants
wishing to migrate have to obtain council housing in their destination region, and that process does not seem to
work well. Hughes and McCormick (1987) argue that council tenants are no less likely than owner-occupiers to
wish to migrate but merely less successful in fulfilling their intentions.
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lower than the average wage among homeowners, mobility also falls in the owner-
occupied sector. A higher rate of owner-occupation is therefore associated with more
unemployment.
Economy-wide booms raise mobility of all workers but affect high-wage workers the
most that move most often in absence of shocks. Economy-wide recessions reduce
regional mobility. Asymmetric shocks increase migration to the booming region and
reduce the number of workers leaving the booming region. Asymmetric shocks affect
mobility of high-wage workers most, so that they are the first to leave a depressed
region.
The type of housing tenure also affects search behavior and hence job matching
because workers search less effectively for new jobs; the higher are their moving costs, the
lower is the income loss associated with unemployment. Because search effectiveness is
an increasing function of mobility, a reduction in mobility leads to less-efficient matching
of unemployed workers to vacancies, as is observed in many European countries. The
choice of housing tenure and its effect on regional mobility is likely to prove an important
step towards explaining the puzzle of European unemployment.
The possibility to commute increases worker’s opportunities and raises their mobility.
To account for commuting and the importance of distance, elements from gravity models
might be integrated with the kind of modelling suggested in this paper. Additional
aspects that could be integrated in a more general model include the consumption and
investment characteristics of housing which affect mobility through adjustments of
housing prices.
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Appendix A. Moving condition in simple model
Proof. Suppose a worker receives a job offer in the other region. If he accepts and moves,
his expected income, Y
a, is given by
Ya ¼ W   km þ
0:5d
1   d
W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ :
His expected income when rejecting, Y
r, and staying is given by
Yr ¼ B þ
0:5d
1   d
W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ :
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W   B > km; which proves equation ð1Þ: 5
Appendix B. Persistent asymmetric shocks
To prove that moving to the booming region (West) becomes more attractive the longer
the boom is expected to persist, suppose it is optimal for a worker in East not to move to
West if the asymmetric shock persists only in the next future period; that is, the worker
does not satisfy W B<k
m d(2q 1)(W B) (condition (2)). If the shock persists for
another period, it is never optimal to move in the second period after not having moved in
the first. If the shock persists for the next two periods, not accepting a job offer in West
yields an expected income of
B þ d ð1   qÞW þ qB fg þ d
2 ð1   qÞW þ qB fg þ d
3V;
where V is the expected stream of income discounted to period 3 which is the same in
expectation for movers and nonmovers. The income when accepting can be calculated by
backward induction and is given by
W   km þ d qW þð 1   qÞB fg þ d
2 qW þð 1   qÞB fg þ d
3V
because W B<k
m d(2q 1)(W B) and W>B. A worker will hence move if
W   B > km   dð2q   1ÞðW   BÞ d
2ð2q   1ÞðW   BÞð B:1Þ
When the shock persists for just one more future period, the moving constraint was given
by condition (2):
W   B > km   dð2q   1ÞðW   BÞ:
Comparing (B.1) with (2) it is obvious that moving becomes more likely because the
additional term, d
2(2q 1)(W B), in (B.1) is positive.
B.1. Serially correlated shocks
If the shock is serially correlated, the moving condition is given by
W   B > km   2dqrkm;
where q is defined as the correlation coefficient and r is a measure of the shock with
0<r<0.5 and 0<q<1. This is derived as follows: Aworker in the depressed region who
accepts a job offer in the booming region and who will always move, has an expected
income of
W   km þ d W   0:5km þ qrkm ðÞ þ d
2 W   0:5km þ q3r3km 
þ ...
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B þ d W   0:5km   qrkm ðÞ þ d
2 W   0:5km þ q3r3km 
þ ...
Notice that the expected income from the second period onwards is the same because the
probability of being in the booming region is the same.
Appendix C. Adverse symmetric shocks
Assume that workers receive a job offer every second period while a job lasts for one
period such that all workers whose job ends become unemployed for at least one period.
We derive the moving constraint for those who receive a job offer outside their home
region. At the time the moving decision has to be made, i.e., in the second period, the
expected income from accepting the job offer equals
W   km þ
d




1   d
2 W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ ;
whereas rejecting the offer yields an income of
B þ
d




1   d
2 W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ ;
so that a worker accepts the job offer and moves if
W   B > km; which is identical to condition ð1Þ:
Appendix D. Mobility and search
The moving condition in the absence of search differs from (1) as a nonsearching
worker becomes unemployed every second period, which lowers the net benefit from
moving. The discounted stream of income for somebody who is offered a job in the other
region and moves is given by
W   km þ
d




1   d
2 W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ ;
while expected income when rejecting the offer equals
B þ
0:5d
1   d
2 W þ max W   km;B ½  ðÞ þ
d
2
1   d
2 B;
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W   B > km þ
0:5d
1 þ d





Consider now the search decision of workers satisfying (D.1). Their expected income
when searching only in the first period is given by
W   s þ
d
1   d
2 W  
0:5d




1   d
2 B;
while not searching yields an expected income of
W þ
d




1   d
2 W  
0:5d
2
1   d
2 km:
Hence, search is optimal if
W   B >
1 þ d
d
s þ 0:5km: ðD:2Þ
A worker satisfying (D.1) will always search on-the-job because his expected income
when always searching is given by
W   s þ
d
1   d
W  
d
1   d
s  
0:5d
1   d
km:
Always searching is hence preferred to never searching if
W   B > þ
1 þ d
d
s þ 0:5km; which gives equation ð7Þ:
The present value of income of workers who optimally reject a job offer outside the home
region equals is given by
W   s þ dð0:5W þ 0:5BÞþd
2½0:5B þ 0:5ð0:5W þ 0:5BÞ  þ d
3½ð:25B þ :75ð0:5W
þ 0:5BÞ  þ ...
when searching only in the first period; while the present value of futureincome when not
searching is given by
W þ dB þ d
2ð0:5W þ 0:5BÞþd
3½0:5B þ 0:5ð0:5W þ 0:5BÞ  þ ...
41 Notice that the term [(0.5d)/(1+d)](W+max[W k
m;B]) [d/(1+d)]B is always positive, confirming that
moving in this setting is generally less attractive than in the simple model.
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W   B >
d þ 2
d
s; which gives equation ð8Þ:
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